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Bringing a new product to market involves both a creative ideation stage, and an execution stage. When
time-to-market constraints are binding it is an important question how to divide limited time between the two
stages and who should make this decision. We introduce a laboratory experiment that closely resembles this
setting: it features a product development task with an open design space, a downstream cost increase and two
development stages. We show that performance is significantly worse when designers choose for themselves
when to transition from ideation to execution and that decision control explains a large share of performance
variation even after controlling for individual differences. How the time is allocated between ideation and
execution does not affect mean performance, but later transition increases risk. One driver of poor design
outcomes in the designer-initiated transition regime are delays in physical construction and testing of designs.
We show that such delays can be prevented by “nudging” designers towards early prototyping. However,
the most important performance driver is the lack of task structure in endogenous regimes, which can be
remedied by demanding a concrete, performance-oriented deliverable prior to a transition.
Key words : New product development, Behavioral perations, Innovation
1. Introduction
A basic feature of product development is that the number of ideas being actively considered
decreases as the development unfolds. Design texts and organizations involved in product develop-
ment refer to this process as the idea or design funnel (Wheelwright and Clark 1992, Cooper et al.
1997, Ulrich and Eppinger 2011). Especially for physical products the winnowing from many to
few ideas is driven by the high costs of turning early ideas and sketches into tangible objects. As
a design moves from rapid prototypes and appearance models to customer-ready versions vetted
on production tool sets using genuine materials, material and tooling costs rise. There are also
increasing time costs as the deadline nears and there is less time to recover from exploratory fail-
ures. Both of these realities prompt design teams to narrow their ideas to a few, and then most
frequently to one, before proceeding into the more expensive development phases.
1
2While most product design teams understand the importance of narrowing down and eventually
committing to an idea, there is little guidance for when to transition from ideation to implementa-
tion and who should make this decision. In this paper we design a laboratory experiment to study
two open questions, unresolved in the literature: (1) When should the transition from the ideation
to the execution phase of development occur? and (2) Should the transition point be imposed
exogenously by management or endogenously decided by the development team?
While those questions are relevant in most development situations our analysis focuses on prod-
uct development contexts with the following characteristics: (a) there is a hard launch date; (b)
there are rising costs as the development effort transits from ideation to implementation; (c) the
product is subject to measurable, objective performance metrics; and (d) there is either a single
designer or a single dominant decision maker on the design team. Development processes with hard
launch dates, rising costs and objectively measurable performance characterize many physical engi-
neered products in automotive component manufacturing, medical diagnostics, defense, industrial
electronics and other industries.
Hard launch dates can derive from contractual obligations in business-to-business and business-
to-government settings, industry trade shows or high selling seasons, all of which can impose
serious penalties for missing the deadline. Excluded would be development processes without a
hard launch deadline, for example a creative writer not under contract, one of the more speculative
development efforts in a company’s portfolio, or situations in which the firm can internally extend
the time-to-market horizon without serious penalty (Cohen et al. 1996, Ho et al. 2002).
Many physical engineered products will experience rising costs over the development effort as pro-
totypes become more polished and use production-quality materials. It is not that design changes
after the transition are impossible, but they are more costly. Indeed, the serious cost consequences
of downstream ECOs (Engineering Change Orders) are legend in many industrial settings (e.g.
Loch and Terwiesch 1999, Terwiesch and Loch 1999). However late changes may incur no additional
cost in other settings, for example graphic design services or editing a novel, and our results may
not apply there.
Objective, measurable performance metrics are typical of engineering products that rely more on
functional objectives and less on subjective aesthetically related ones, or where success or failure
of a new product depends on the ability of the firm to match new offerings with poorly understood
consumer tastes. Our results may not apply, for example, in the fashion or entertainment industries.
Design efforts featuring a single dominant decision maker (working alone or leading a team) is a
formal characteristic of some efforts (for example, furniture companies which contract with well-
known designers) and an informal characteristic of others (a dominant decision maker can arise
organically within a team, or be a de facto reality in companies with a clear power hierarchy among
3the departments represented on the team). In these decisions are concentrated in the hands of one
person rather than being shared (c.f. Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995, Clark and Fujimoto 1991). Our
results may not apply in settings lacking this feature.
To be able to control the design progress and the resources (costs and time) consumed by the
development it is common today for an organization to adopt some variant of a phase-review
framework (Krishnan and Ulrich 2001, Ulrich and Eppinger 2011). At a high level these frameworks
feature an “ideation” phase (where the general design strategy is determined), a “realization” or
“execution” phase (where the idea is rendered in more accurate materials first using prototyping
and later mass production tools and machines), and a “commercialization” phase (where all the
remaining business aspects of product launch and ramp up are put into place, including supply chain
formation, sales force training, communications and promotions, fulfillment, etc.). In this paper we
study the first two phases. From a designer’s perspective phase-review stages can also be viewed as
stages of a creative process that begins with a design mandate and ends in the implementation of
the chosen idea(s) in a final, fully functional product. These are creative processes in that only the
design constraints are provided and designers can explore an open-ended landscape of unknown
potential for the best solution they can find that satisfies those constraints.
We argue that the time allocation to development phases and decision control may affect design
behaviors with important consequences for design performance. We examine those effects in an
experimental task that involves designing and building a physical object. Our experimental task is
a physical design challenge that reproduces the four process features listed above. It has binding
time constraints and it has two phases with a transition point after which there is an increased
opportunity cost for expended materials. Designs are subject to an objective, measurable perfor-
mance metric, and we study the behaviors of individual designers. Within the described context
participants are free to pursue their own unique ideation and implementation strategies exploring
an open-ended but searchable solution space in which the optimal is (and will forever be) unknown.
In our experiments ideation phase exploration is essentially free but in execution phase explo-
ration is made costly. The total amount of time to complete the task is fixed by a binding deadline
and is kept constant across all of our treatments while the relative allocation of time to ideation
and execution is varied in the treatments. In three Exogenous schedule treatments the transition
time is imposed externally. The designer is assigned to either an early (after 25% of the time),
midpoint (after 50% of the time) or late (after 75% of the time) transition. Which of these is
best is not clear: with an early transition point the designer may not have enough time to find a
breakthrough idea but will have more time for polished execution. A later transition point allows
more time for ideation but may jeopardize the timely realization of the chosen idea. Do you want
4to spend more time searching for a great idea, or executing a given idea? Or, would you prefer the
compromise solution of transiting at the halfway point?
How flexible the transition point should be and who will ultimately make the transition deci-
sion is equally important. The designer or design team has richer information about the progress
of the ideation task and may be in a better position to declare when to transit into higher cost
development (Bell 1969). Also, giving them ownership over the process could increase their sense
of satisfaction, or responsibility or both (Hackman and Oldham 1980, Pasmore 1988). Being better
informed and more motivated should have positive design consequences. Alternatively, the ideation
phase may be more intrinsically enjoyable than execution which may delay the transition (Boudreau
et al. 2003). Or, the additional cognitive burden of deciding when to transit may detract from the
energy invested in the ideation process. An exogenously imposed transition point could also serve
as a concrete goal, which may have motivational benefits (Locke and Latham 2002). Procrastina-
tion, lack of structure and/or cognitive load may have negative design consequences. Our fourth
experimental treatment addresses the question of who should select the transition point by letting
the designer rather than the experimenter choose the transition time.
Our study is the first attempt we are aware of to study the effects of different development
schedules on design strategies and performance. Our contributions fall into three categories. First,
to be able to study the internal creative process of generating and evaluating design alternatives
we introduce a unique data-gathering method. This includes a new experimental task and a struc-
tured approach to tracking and recording design strategies while maintaining experimental control.
The resulting data set is a rich collection of variables that capture not only how well individuals
perform, but also what design activities they engage and what types of ideas they develop both
of which consolidate our findings by explaining why certain development schedules induce better
performance.
Second, our main experimental results are surprising given the conventional wisdom about the
trade-off of experimentation (to find a good idea) versus execution (to implement the idea in
functional form), which would lead one to suspect some monotonic or U-shaped performance in
transition time. We find that mean performance levels are statistically indistinguishable when
the amount of time allocated to the ideation vs. execution phase is varied exogenously. There
is, however a variance effect that aligns with intuition: both the probability of failure and mean
performance conditional on non-failure increase with the length of the ideation phase, hence there
is a risk-return tradeoff when choosing the length of the ideation time. By contrast, endogenously
chosen transition points are uniformly worse than any of the exogenous times. That is, the designers
perform worse when they have to make the transition decision on their own, compared to each of
the exogenously imposed transition times. In additional treatments we examine several competing
5explanations and show that the dominant cause of improved performance is the clear punctuation
of the exploratory and the delivery phases in exogenous transition regimes.
Third, our results add texture to several conventional design wisdoms. In particular, we find
that (consistent with the conventional development paradigms) early build, testing and failing fast
are associated with superior design performance, and that these behaviors occur less frequently
when designers are given scheduling autonomy. That is, early physical experimentation is both a
direct contributor to performance, and an observable manifestation of a more latent cognitive effect
that can be influenced with managerial regimes. Another popular recommendation, “Quantity
is Quality” features mixed results in our experiments, and is probably not uniformly true. Our
results also indicate that the quality of generated ideas, the ability to select the best ideas and to
implement the chosen idea in functional form can all be vehicles for success or failure.
2. Literature
The streams of literature that inform our first question (how long should the development phases
be?) and our second question (who should make the allocation decision?) have few overlaps. In the
following we will first discuss the OM literature on the relative time allocation to the development
phases and then move to broader psychology, marketing and job design work on creativity and
project management.
2.1. Operational factors
The question of how to schedule product development phases has attracted some attention in
OM. In an early empirical study Mansfield (1988) finds that Japanese manufacturers were able
to improve new product quality without increasing development costs by allocating a significantly
larger share of time and money to the implementation stages of the process compared to US firms
which tend to spread resources evenly over the development stages. The subsequent literature
considers several distinct forces driving the transition timing, however the high-level trade-off is
often similar. Early transition to execution can result in insufficient exploration and poorer design
choices. Late transition can facilitate the discovery of a better design configuration, but is costly
in development and puts timely completion at risk (Verganti 1999, Biazzo 2009).
One of the objectives of product development is to achieve a product-market fit (Krishnan and
Ulrich 2001). Transitioning from ideation to execution early on may compromise the product-
market fit especially when the market is not fully defined and downstream redesign is prohibitively
costly. The time when design features are finalized should therefore depend on the pace at which
market intelligence becomes available and on the ability of the firm to implement late design
changes further downstream (Krishnan et al. 1997). Later transition lets the design team follow the
market more closely, but leaves little time for more incremental improvements that help reduce the
6production costs and increase the manufacturing yields (Cohen et al. 1996, O¨zer and Uncu 2013).
Therefore, the transition to the execution phase should occur early when customers prioritize prices
over quality assuming that the cost savings achieved during the later stages of development can be
passed on to the customers (Kalyanaram and Krishnan 1997, Bhattacharya et al. 1998).
The cited OM papers invoke plausible assumptions regarding the design effects of different tran-
sition times, but most are not validated with data and none delve into the behavioral drivers of
those effects. The implicit assumption is that more time allocated to a stage will result in better
execution of that stage. One of our goals is to explore the behavior of designers working under
different time schedules in order to learn about the behavioral consequences of early vs. late transi-
tion, as well as of internal vs. externally imposed decision control. Holding the contextual (market
and technological) factors constant we study the consequences of the timing of the transition and
the operational autonomy on the design activities and the effects of these activities on design
performance.
2.2. Job design and task structure
While the OM literature focuses on the factors exogenously determined by the firm’s technological
and market environment some worker-centric arguments can be found in the job design and work
processes literature. In a series of studies of behavioral dynamics in individuals and teams working
towards a deadline Gersick (1988, 1989, 1991) finds that individuals perceive the midpoint of the
work period as a transformative moment and that this realization helps them to transition from
initial learning and exploration to more execution-related activities. Choo (2014) presents evidence
for a midpoint effect empirically in a study of Six Sigma project schedules: he finds a U-shaped
effect of problem definition time on project duration. If these findings apply to design-related
tasks, we should see halfway transitions resulting in better performance than either late or early
transitions.
Regarding decision control Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) find that individuals struggle to stick
to self-imposed deadlines and perform better when a long task is split into equally spaced inter-
vals with intermediate deliverables. Dennis et al. (1996, 1999) arrive at similar results using a
business-challenge task in a laboratory setting. In the same vein, goal-setting theory (c.f. Locke
and Latham 2002) would predict that an exogenous transition time may function as a specific goal
serving as an important motivator. If the advantages of time decomposition extend to design tasks,
managers should impose the transition time exogenously upon the design team, rather than give
them operational autonomy. There is some support for externally imposed time constraints from
the human resource management literature. In particular, workers often prefer spending their time
on tasks that “are the easiest, most familiar, or most satisfying”(Boudreau et al. 2003) rather than
7allocating their time in a performance-maximizing way. Therefore, individuals may be unable to
correctly allocate their time if one of the activities (e.g. exploration of ideas) is intrinsically more
enjoyable than the other activities.
However, a larger part of the human resource literature would support a designer-determined
transition time. Research in the job design literature supports the hypothesis that granting work-
ers autonomy to make important decisions will positively affect performance (c.f. Hackman and
Oldham 1980, Pasmore 1988), especially when the challenges workers face are relatively unpre-
dictable, as would be the case in creative tasks (c.f. Bell 1969, and references there). This finding
has been reinforced in the product development context. Using structured interviews with product
development executives Sethi and Iqbal (2008) show in a survey of R&D managers that when a
phase-review process is enforced rigidly new product performance can suffer. Maccormack et al.
(2001) conduct a survey of firms in the tech industry and find that flexible development processes
are associated with better performing projects than processes in which the design team follows an
uncompromising schedule of completion dates with stringent criteria.
To summarize the extant literature, OM models suggest that the optimal time allocation between
ideation and execution can depend on contextual factors such as technological pace, engineering
and supplier flexibility, and market forces but is relatively silent on the internal behavioral and
cognitive dynamics at play. Behavioral models in psychology and job design do not address our
contextual setting directly, and offer (mixed) recommendations for task assignment in general. No
single stream of research can be directly extrapolated to our experimental setting, in which we
abstract away from external contextual detail and explore the internal consequences of varying
ideation versus execution times and decision rights. Consequently, rather than forming ex ante
hypotheses based on extant theory, we adopt a more inductive, exploratory approach to our data.
2.3. Experimental tasks in the literature
The psychology literature is dominated by tests of “creative production” (for example concept
lists) that focus on ideation, or tests of “creative insight” (i.e. puzzles or riddles) that invoke an
“aha” moment (Sawyer 2012). Examples of the latter include the 9-dot problem and the candle
problem (Duncker 1945), both of which have a process dimension with the candle task also having
a physical execution component. However, both tasks have only one (discovered) solution whereas
the product development setting has an open-ended landscape of solutions each of which can be
evaluated on a continuous scale.
There have been several attempts to study the invention of useful physical objects (Finke et al.
1992, Moreau and Dahl 2005) and new product definition decisions (Ederer and Manso 2013, Herz
et al. 2014). None of those tasks reflect the development-specific structure with distinct phases and
8development costs increasing over time. Methodologically, our analysis is related to the studies by
Kornish and Ulrich (2011) and Girotra et al. (2010) who both study the features of ideas generated
in a business idea challenge and relate them to performance. While our experiment is different in
that it has a physical execution component in addition to the ideation stage, we also study the
pool of all generated ideas and find that there are multiple drivers of performance with ideation,
selection and implementation of the idea each accounting for some of the observed performance
differences.
3. Experimental Design
To address the specifics of the product development setting we develop a real-effort physical task
with an infinite strategy space. Our task reflects development contexts with (a) hard launch dates,
(b) increasing costs to exploration, (c) objectively measurable performance metrics and (d) an
individual designer or a strong team leader making design decisions.
3.1. Subjects and task description
118 subjects were recruited at the University of Michigan to participate in the study. The mean
age of the subjects was 22.4. Approximately one half of the subjects were students with a major
in social sciences and arts (including business and economics); the other half were students with a
major in sciences, medicine and mathematics. Subjects were paid a $5 show-up fee plus a payoff
contingent on their performance in the design task. The total payoff including show-up fee ranged
from $6 to $32.1 Our experimental task is a version of a challenge used at international creativity
competitions among high schools and colleges. Participants worked individually on the following
task: given 10 playing cards and 10 paper clips build a structure as tall as possible that will support
as many coins as possible (up to a maximum of 16 dollar quarters).2
Participants were informed that the task consisted of two phases. During phase 1 all participants
were given ample materials to experiment and explore. During phase 2 participants were given only
10 cards and 10 clips to work with. At the end of the experiment, each participant was required to
present his/her structure that contained at most the 10 cards, 10 clips and 16 quarters they were
given. Participants were free to use their time as they saw fit and were only constrained by the
amount of materials in phase 2. In particular, they did not have to replicate the phase 1 design
during phase 2.
1 Appendix A presents detailed demographics data.
2 For the exact transcript of the experimental instructions see Appendix D. The full set of instructions including
uncertainty attitudes elicitation is included in the supplementary document.
9Participants were paid based on the performance of their final design in phase 2. Performance
was determined by the product of the number of coins and the construction height. The following
formula was used to scale the payoffs to an average hourly rate of approximately $15:
Monetary value of supported coins×height of the structure in inches
3
3.2. Experimental procedures
In all treatments participants were given 20 minutes in total.3 They were randomly assigned to
one of four treatments. Three treatments featured an exogenously imposed transition from the
ideation phase to the execution phase while varying the shares of the time allocated to the phases.
In these treatments participants were given 5 (10, 15) minutes for ideation, after which ideation
materials were taken away. Then participants received the second (exactly 10 cards and 10 clips)
set of materials, and were asked to build the structure that was to be submitted for performance
evaluation. They then had 15 (10, 5) minutes to finish their work.
In the fourth treatment we asked participants to choose their own transition time. Participants
were instructed to raise their hand to indicate the transition to the execution phase, after which
their exploration materials were collected and the second (constrained) set of materials was dis-
tributed. We refer to this treatment as the Endogenous treatment. In section 6 we will consider
three additional treatments in which transitions were also endogenously determined by the design-
ers, but either the information provided to the designers or the mechanics of the transitions differed.
The specific details of the experimental procedures for those additional treatments will be discussed
later.
We used a between-subjects design with 4 experimental sessions run in each treatment. Par-
ticipants were monitored discreetly by cameras placed behind a one-way mirror located close to
the ceiling of the laboratory.4 Throughout the experiment participants were separated from their
neighbors by partition panels. Remaining time was announced every 5 minutes and a clock was pro-
jected on a large screen, visible to all participants. Upon completion of the design task we elicited
subjects’ risk and ambiguity attitudes using the Holt and Laury method (Holt and Laury 2002)
3 When choosing the appropriate duration of the task our objective was to impose binding time constraints, and at
the same time provide enough time for exploration of the design space. To calibrate the allowed development time we
ran a pilot session with 9 participants. The task duration was 20 minutes. Each subject was able to complete the task
and earn at least a $3 payoff, with five subjects achieving payoffs above $10. At the same time, all subjects appeared
to be working throughout the duration of the task, i.e. the time deadline was binding. The pilot results are not part
of the analysis due to minor changes in the instructions, however including the pilot data does not affect our main
results.
4 A consent form informing the participants about the videotaping was distributed and signed before the experiment.
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and administered the Need for Cognitive Closure survey (42-item questionnaire about uncertainty
attitudes, Webster and Kruglanski 1994).5
4. Experiment 1: Results
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. This section will investigate whether design
performance and design activities vary with the transition time and with the initiator of the
transition. Sections 4.1-4.3 will examine the differences at the performance level. Sections 4.4-
4.6 will use the video data to study the micro-process engaged by the designers (discussion of
the video-analysis methodology is postponed until section 4.4). Section 5 will examine several
additional scenarios with endogenous transitions and section 6 will re-examine our data focusing
on the relative importance of idea generation, selection and implementation.
4.1. Performance comparisons: Measurement
Performance is measured as the dollar payoff obtained in the design task. We begin with per-
formance comparisons across the four treatments using two-sided non-parametric tests. We then
present more precise estimates of mean performance differences obtained in OLS and Tobit regres-
sions controlling for demographic differences and endogenously chosen transition times. We further
examine the performance distributions generated by each treatment using tests of stochastic dom-
inance, tests of equality of variances and quantile regressions. We will sometimes use the short
notation 5/15, 10/10, 15/5 when referring to the three Exogenous treatments, Exog when referring
to the pooled Exogenous treatment and Endog when referring to the Endogenous treatment.
4.2. Performance comparisons: Results
4.2.1. Design performance comparisons Mean performance in each treatment is shown in
panel (a) of Figure 1. The differences between any two of the three Exogenous treatment groups
are not significant at any conventional level (Rank Sum test, lowest p= 0.491). In contrast, there
is a significant difference of $2.25 between the means of the pooled Exogenous and the Endoge-
nous treatments ($5.64 vs $3.39, Rank Sum test, p = 0.012). That is, the design performance is
improved by about 66% if an average designer’s schedule is changed from endogenously determined
to exogenously imposed. Both the means and the medians of performance in each of the Exoge-
nous treatments are higher than in the Endogenous treatment with the 5/15 and 10/10 treatments
being significantly better (Rank Sum test, p = 0.024 and p = 0.020). The 15/5 treatment is not
significantly different from the Endogenous treatment despite having a higher mean and median
5 In addition to the main task earnings participants could earn between $1 and $5 from the elicitation of risk and
ambiguity preferences. None of the elicited risk and ambiguity attitude measures were significantly related to design
performance.
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Figure 1 Performance across treatments
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Note. In panel (a) bars show mean treatment performance ($). Panel (b) shows distributions of performance by
treatment. In panel (b) three observations in the 10/10 treatment feature performance greater than $16 ($17.3, $17.3
and $24). Support values of performance distribution in the other treatments reach a maximum value of $16. For
presentation purpose in panel (b) these three observations in the 10/10 treatment have been assigned a value of $16.
(Rank Sum test, p= 0.135). This is driven by the high dispersion of performance outcomes in the
15/5 treatment rather than by a smaller magnitude of the difference.
While different exogenous allocations of time to development phases do not change mean per-
formance, they do affect the likelihood of design failure. 23% of participants in the 15/5 treatment
are not able to build a viable structure as compared to 13% in the 10/10 treatment (Two-sided
Proportion test, p= 0.348) and 4% in the 5/15 treatment (p= 0.055). The occurrence of failures
rises monotonically with the length of the ideation phase for the Exogenous transition (Trend test,
p= 0.052, Cuzick 1985). However, at 33% the proportion of zeroes is the highest for the Endogenous
transition group with the difference between Endogenous and pooled Exogenous treatments being
significant at p = 0.018 (Proportion test). The percentages of design failures, mean performance
and mean performance conditional on non-failure are summarized in Table 1.
Regression results in Table 2 confirm the results of non-parametric tests. Participants in the
Endogenous transition group perform uniformly worse than each of the Exogenous treatment
groups. Columns (1) and (2) show Probit marginal effects with non-failure as the dependent vari-
able. When the decision-maker is concerned with minimizing the risk of design failure the 5/15 and
the 10/10 treatments are both significantly better than endogenous decision control. In contrast,
15/5 is not significantly different from the Endogenous treatment.6 Columns (3) and (4) report the
OLS coefficients with design performance as the dependent variable. Given a baseline performance
6 To check whether multiple hypothesis testing had a notable influence on our results we calculated Bonferroni-
Holm adjusted p-values (Holm 1979) for this and other important results. Multiple hypothesis adjustment has been
suggested in the experimental literature to counteract potential type I errors resulting from testing the effects of
multiple independent treatments on the same outcome variable (c.f. Athey and Imbens 2016, List et al. 2016). For
additional details on the adjustment methodology and for the summary of results see Appendix C.
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Table 1 Summary statistics of participant performance by treatment
% Failures
Mean
performance ($)
Mean performance
given non-failure ($)
Endog 33.33 3.39 5.08
5/15 4.17 5.17 5.39
10/10 13.33 6.28 7.24
15/5 22.58 5.38 6.95
All treatments 25.31 5.01 6.22
Note. % Failures column shows the percentage of participants unable to present a valid structure after 20 minutes.
Mean performance column shows performance measured as the dollar payoff obtained in the design task (excluding
the show-up fee of $5 and payoffs from uncertainty attitudes elicitation). Mean performance given non-failure shows
mean performance of the subjects who were able to present a valid structure.
of $3.39 obtained in the Endogenous transition treatment (Endogenous treatment is the omitted
dummy variable in all regressions in Table 2), performance differentials range from $1.78 to $3.18
depending on the specification and the assigned Exogenous treatment.
Columns (5) and (6) report Tobit regression coefficients accounting for the clustering of perfor-
mance outcomes at zero to improve the precision of the estimates and also allowing estimation
of the (conditional) treatment effects for non-zero performance. Tobit regressions show similar
effect magnitudes and slightly improved precision. Unconditional marginal effects range from $2.19
(p = 0.054) for the 15/5 treatment to $3.08 for the 10/10 treatment (p = 0.010). Conditional on
non-failure the treatment effects range from $1.77 to $2.50 accounting for approximately 72% of
the unconditional marginal effects.7
In sum, each of the exogenous schedules dominates the endogenously determined schedules. The
treatment effects on performance can be traced in part to design failures, but these do not fully
explain the results since a substantial gap remains after controlling for non-failure.
4.2.2. Variance effects in performance. Especially for creative tasks the decision-maker
may be interested in the right tail of the performance distribution rather than in measures of
central tendency, so it is useful to examine the entire distribution of performance in each treatment.
Figure 1b) suggests that each Exogenous treatment dominates the Endogenous treatment in the
sense of First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD). Formally, FOSD tests (Anderson 1996, Ng
et al. 2011) confirm the dominance in performance of the (pooled) Exogenous treatments (highest
7 Age and college major help identify two subpopulations of subjects who performed significantly better than the
rest: subjects who were enrolled in sciences, mathematics and engineering (n= 52) and older subjects (median split
by age, resulting in n= 59). For robustness we ran all regression specifications on these subpopulations. Treatment
effects are greater in magnitude relative to the full sample: unconditional average marginal effects are between 2.91
and 4.64 for the Tobit specification in column (6), p-values are between 0.013 and 0.097.
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p= 0.042).8 This means that the Exogenous treatments would yield a higher expected utility for
the Endogenous treatment for any decision maker with a non-decreasing utility function.
While the pooled Exogenous treatments dominate the Endogenous treatment at any given quan-
tile, the size of the performance gap depends on the transition time and the quantile range (see figure
1b). In particular, the performance gap between 10/10 and the Endogenous treatment remains
substantial ($2-$4) at any within-group quantile. By contrast, the gap is relatively narrow ($0-$2)
for the bottom 60% when comparing 15/5 and the Endogenous treatment and for the top 40%
when comparing 5/15 and the Endogenous treatment. This suggests a variance effect in transition
time. Indeed, the 5/15 and 15/5 treatment cdfs exhibit a single-crossing property implying that
the preferred exogenous regime depends on the risk preferences of the decision-maker in question.
The variance increase is confirmed by tests of equality of variances (Levene 1960). The variance in
the 5/15 treatment is lower than the variance in pooled 10/10 and 15/5 treatments, and also lower
than in the 15/5 treatment (p= 0.069 and p= 0.075).9
In sum, while there are no differences in mean performance there are variance effects in perfor-
mance within the Exogenous treatments. While a risk neutral decision-maker would be indifferent
in transition time (as long as it is imposed exogenously), a risk-averse decision-maker would avoid
long ideation phases while a risk-seeking decision maker would avoid short ideation phases.
4.2.3. Endogenously chosen transition times. We next study when designers make the
transition when they are given the decision rights and whether performance differs with the endoge-
nously chosen times. The average endogenously chosen transition time is 10.74 minutes. With
endogenous transitions, later transition times are associated with significantly reduced performance
(ρ = −0.365, p = 0.037). That is, while performance is invariant in transition time with exoge-
nously determined schedules, performance deteriorates in transition time for designer-determined
schedules.
Exogenous transitions lead to significantly improved performance both before and after con-
trolling for the transition times. The pooled Exogenous treatment has an average advantage of
$2.77 (Tobit regression, p < 0.01) relative to the Endogenous treatment. After controlling for the
8 Anderson (1996) is a test based on splitting within-group outcomes into discrete categories and then comparing
the incidence in each category between treatment groups. Different splits of the sample are possible as long as
each category has a sufficient number of values. We find significant results (p < 0.05) for specifications with up to
4 categories. Ng et al. (2011) method uses quantile regression coefficients (and their asymptotic distributions) to
determine whether one group has consistently higher/lower marginal effects over a range of quantiles.
9 The following example illustrates the preference order. Suppose a decision-maker is an expected utility maximizer
characterized by the power utility function u(x) = xa. Given the performance data in the Exogenous treatments,
she prefers 5/15 for a ∈ (0,0.44), and 10/10 for a ∈ [0.44,∞). The least preferred exogenous allocation is 15/5 for
a ∈ (0,0.85) and 5/15 for a ∈ [0.85,∞). That is, later transition is characterized by both greater upside and greater
downside risk, but there are some non-linearities in the underlying data (the marginal improvement in performance
given non-failure is strong as one goes from 5/15 to 10/10 but negligible as one goes from 10/10 to 15/5).
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Table 2 Performance comparisons across treatments.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit Probit OLS OLS Tobit Tobit
5/15 treatment 1.301** 1.416*** 1.780 2.372* 3.039* 3.688**
(0.513) (0.523) (1.217) (1.310) (1.679) (1.720)
10/10 treatment 0.680* 0.794** 2.891** 3.177** 3.859** 4.181**
(0.368) (0.401) (1.363) (1.363) (1.589) (1.608)
15/5 treatment 0.322 0.395 1.996 2.406* 2.602 3.093*
(0.338) (0.361) (1.268) (1.311) (1.585) (1.598)
Constant 0.431* 0.390 3.386*** -2.866 1.985* -4.473
(0.227) (0.796) (0.783) (3.894) (1.125) (3.997)
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 118 112 118 112 118 112
Note. Probit, OLS and Tobit coefficients are reported. Dependent variable is non-failure (1Performance>0) for Probit
and continuous Performance ($) for OLS and Tobit. Endogenous treatment dummy is omitted in all specifications.
Controls are age, gender and Engineering major (Yes/No). * p < 0.1,** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01.
transition times the gap is almost unchanged at $2.76. However, after adding the interaction term
between the Endogenous treatment dummy and the transition time we find that the performance
gap between Endog and Exog increases in transition time. The performance effect of Exogenous
transition is negligible and not statistically significant when comparing performance at the 5th
minute ($0.48, p = 0.793). However, it increases in magnitude and statistical significance with
later transition time reaching $2.49 at the 10th minute and $3.91 at the 15th minute (the effect is
significant at p < 0.05 starting with minute 9).
Summarizing the performance comparisons in experiment 1, in the Exogenous treatments the
increase in risk of failure with longer ideation is at least partially offset by the improved performance
of non-zero constructions. That is, later transition increases the risk but does not affect mean
performance. In contrast, performance in the Endogenous treatment is uniformly worse than in
any of the Exogenous treatments with later endogenous transitions performing worse than earlier
endogenous transitions.
4.3. Performance comparisons: Discussion
Given that designers have heterogeneous abilities and may differ in their exploration strategy one
could expect that they are in a good position to decide when to initiate the transition and start
execution. We have seen the opposite, that the Endogenous transition treatment does worse than
any of the Exogenous treatments even after controlling for age, major and the endogenously chosen
transition times.
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Endogenous treatment participants tended to fail more, garnering zero reward, but even
restricted to non-failures the Exogenous scenarios are better than the Endogenous scenario. In fact
increased failures explain only 1/3 of the advantage of the Exogenous treatment. The advantage
of the Exogenous decision control extends to the entire distribution of performance outcomes with
the Endogenous treatment being first order stochastically dominated by the combined Exogenous
treatments. The negative effects of internal decision control persist for comparisons at any within-
group performance percentile, so a decision maker prefers the Exogenous treatments as long as her
utility function is non-decreasing in payoffs.
Can the inferior performance of the Endogenous transition group be explained by the transition
times they choose? We explored this alternative by making performance comparisons between
Exogenous and Endogenous groups holding transition times constant and found that transition
time and decision control interact. When designers have to choose transition times for themselves
we see a deterioration of performance with later transition times suggesting that late transitions
are at least partially responsible for the observed treatment differences. A plausible interpretation
of this finding is that designers who transition late are forced into executing their design under
time pressure and this hurts performance. Few of them are able to exploit a long ideation phase to
find a truly exceptional (and executable) design. However, even when the time split is 50-50 the
gap between the Endogenous and the Exogenous groups remains significant, so poor performance
of those who choose to transition late does not explain all of the performance gap.
In contrast to the substantial differences between the Exogenous and Endogenous treatments,
all of the Exogenous groups do similarly well in mean performance. However, we find that the risk
of failure (zero payoff) increases in transition time, suggesting a risk-return trade-off that aligns
with intuition. Longer ideation times and shorter execution times are higher risk schedules. The
converse, short ideation times and long execution times have the lowest performance improvement
relative to the endogenous base case conditional on non-failure. This makes intuitive sense. While
it is not clear that these effects will exactly balance (so there is no statistical difference among
treatments) in more general cases, we would still expect risk-averse decisions makers to prefer
shorter ideation and longer execution times.
Our review of the job design and the organizational psychology literature (section 2.2) suggested
three potential mechanisms that may drive poor performance in the endogenous transition regime.
The first one, the idea that the intrinsic enjoyment of one of the phases may prevent an efficient
endogenous allocation of time is not supported in our data. Mean performance does not vary
with exogenous time allocation, so in principle any (reasonably) chosen transition time could lead
to good performance. Rather, there appears to be something about the exogeneity of the time
constraint that improves design performance. Either of the two remaining mechanisms suggested in
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the literature (increased cognitive load in endogenous transitions and motivational effects of process
goals) could drive the performance gap. The next sections will further unpack the performance
advantage of exogenous transition regimes by analyzing the design activities (sections 4.4-4.6) and
by examining alternative managerial regimes that keep transitions endogenous but change some
aspects of the transition process (section 5).
4.4. Design Process: Measurement
We continue the investigation by looking at the micro-structure of the creative effort and examine
what behaviors are related to improved performance and whether those behaviors differ with
the time allocation and decision control. Using individual-level videos we were able to record (a)
subjects’ activities, i.e. their exploration and testing strategies and (b) the structural properties of
the ideas they launch, both of which help develop intuition for what is good design practice and
how those strategies and ideas differ with endogenous/exogenous decision control.
4.4.1. Data-gathering approach To allow insight into the micro-structure of the creative
exercise and its relationship to outcomes the video data first required an interpretive stage to go
from the raw data to data amenable to statistical analysis. Qualitative research techniques were
designed specifically to achieve such mappings. The body of work on qualitative methods is now
extensive (c.f. Strauss 1991, Miles and Huberman 1994, Maxwell 2012, Saldan˜a 2011, Yin 2013,
and references there), and converges on “coding” as the method of choice to map unstructured
inputs into more highly structured data.
A code is a symbol (letter, number, word or phrase) that reflects the content of a segment of
qualitative data. Researchers derive codes either inductively (looking at the visuals and cataloging
what appears to be happening) or deductively (constructing categories based on existing theory
and/or the research questions being asked) or, as in our case, a combination of the two. Since we
were looking at idea generation and execution, our attention was naturally focused on those and
related activities. Then, once a code is derived, the compromising effects of subjectivity are reduced
by having independent researchers code the videos (mapping visual inputs into code categories
with time stamps), and further reduced by using multiple independent coders and looking for
consistency among them.
In most cases, and in ours, deriving a usable coding scheme is a time-consuming iterative pro-
cess. Each of the co-authors reviewed videos and proposed a scheme designed to capture subjects’
behaviors, and then all co-authors attempted to use each scheme on a varying test set of videos
in a search for agreement. After several convergence failures with alternative coding schemes we
generated one based on cataloging the structural elements of an idea and reviewed the final struc-
tures generated by the subjects to assure comprehensiveness (see the supplementary document for
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our final coding scheme and figure 2 for examples of some structures and their codes). We then
recruited and trained student coders and asked that each coder analyze each video and record the
results in a data sheet. These data sheets were checked for inter-coder consistency and then used
as inputs to our analysis.
The coders were unaware of the experimental results and the research questions. The coded
variables were aggregated by averaging the values submitted by the coders. Each coder first worked
on three training videotapes (which covered a wide range of construction strategies) to provide a
sufficient level of understanding of the tracking and classification method. To ensure that coding
outcomes did not interact with the treatments we assigned and randomized the order in which the
videotapes were coded. The data set was divided into 8 parts with each treatment split into 2 parts.
The order in which the coders performed the coding was ABCDABCD for coder 1, BCDABCDA
for coder 2 and CDABCDAB for coder 3.10
4.4.2. Recording design ideas The main building block of our coding approach is a “design
idea” or a “design strategy” which characterizes the basic appearance features of each construction
launched by a designer. Each design idea was characterized by four attributes:
1. general form (P/WB/ML/Fl)
2. load bearing strategy (V/A)
3. integration of components (SEP/MP)
4. use of materials (F/T/P)
The first attribute, the construction’s general form can be a “pedestal” (P), a “wall/box” (WB), a
“multiple-legs” structure (ML) and a “flat stack” (Fl). A “pedestal” is characterized by a narrow
load-bearing surface. The difference between WB and ML is that WB features multiple, connected
(or visibly touching across a large surface) cards making up a wall. ML has several stand-alone
“legs” connected only on top. Fl is a flat stack of cards piled horizontally. The second attribute
of an idea is its load bearing strategy which can be vertical (V), angled (A), or both. The third
attribute refers to how the construction components (coins or layers) are connected. Components
can have a separating surface card between them (SEP) or a multi-purpose surface, for example
when coins are placed directly on the sharp corner of a folded card. The fourth attribute, use
of materials can include folding (F), tearing (T) and piercing (P), or any combination of those
elements. Figure 2 demonstrates several ideas along with their assigned codes.
Many construction ideas featured more than one layer. For such multi-layered constructions first
each layer was characterized using the 4-attribute vector. Then, if layers were identical the entire
10 Our main concern in creating a randomized coding order were possible learning and fatigue effects. The total net
runtime of the videotapes exceeds 40 hours and coders typically spent an additional 40 hours interpreting and filling
in the coding forms. The supplementary document provides several inter-coder reliability measures for the design
strategy variables. Most of the variables show high levels of consistency.
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Figure 2 A sample of design ideas
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P/ML-V-MP/SEP-F 
 
ML/WB-A/V-SEP-F 
 
Fl-V-SEP ML-V-SEP-F WB-V-SEP-F 
Note. The images are examples of single-level and two-level structures annotated with their code.
construction was characterized using the layer code (c.f. the leftmost construction in the bottom
row of figure 2). If a construction exhibited two or more different layers the attributes of each layer
were included in the code (see for example the three rightmost constructions in the bottom row of
figure 2).
4.4.3. Variable definition Assigning a descriptive code to each idea creates a clear rule that
helps distinguish a new idea from a variation on an existing idea. A new idea was recorded each
time any of the four elements of the idea code were changed. The change of code could either be
triggered by a change of the structural properties of an existing construction or by an addition of a
layer with a hitherto unused structural property. We used the number of design ideas each subject
entertained before committing to a design as a measure for idea quantity.
In addition to counting the number of ideas we also recorded the times when each idea was
launched and when it was abandoned. Similarly, we tracked and recorded several other activities
engaged by the designers. In particular, we recorded the number of coin stacking attempts, the
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number of construction collapses as well as the times when those events occurred. The descriptive
statistics of these variables are presented in Appendix B.11
4.5. Design Process: Results
4.5.1. Design activities and design performance With exogenous decision control the
frequency of failures and mean performance given non-failure both increased with later transitions
leading to a risk-return trade-off in ideation time. The design process data are consistent with those
performance results. In particular, in the Exogenous treatments time-to-last stacking increases
monotonically in transition time (Trend test, p < 0.01), and later stacking is associated with higher
failure rates (ρ= 0.16 across treatments, p= 0.025). Exogenous transitions also exhibit some dif-
ferences in times-to-last idea, a measure of the extent to which subjects engage in exploration of
the design space. In particular, with later transition subjects spend more time before they commit
to an idea (6:22 min in 5/15, 07:34 min in 10/10, 08:05 min in 15/5). Delaying commitment
to a design idea may improve the chances of finding an exceptional design, but it also increases
the risk of failure, both of which is reflected in the performance data. However, the increase of
the times-to-last idea in transition time is not significant (Trend test: p= 0.156), indicating that
there is some degree of endogeneity in how much time is spent on ideation even with exogenous
transition.12
There are also several process differences between the (pooled) exogenous and the endogenous
transitions. We focus in particular on the differences in activity timing.13 Figure 3a)-3c) shows
that the times of launching the first idea, the first test and experiencing the first collapse each
occur with a substantial delay in the Endogenous treatment (Rank Sum tests, p= 0.017, p= 0.011,
p = 0.091). That is, designers in the Endogenous condition spend more time pondering about
possible design strategies or exploring the materials before launching a (recognizable) design idea.
We also ran duration analysis (using Cox proportional hazard model) with time-to-first stacking and
time-to-first idea as dependent duration variables. Consistent with the non-parametric test results
11 Our list of variables initially included the number and times of variations on each idea. However, due to low
consistency (correlations across coders < 0.3) those variables were discarded. We also attempted to combine measures
of search behavior and testing/failures by looking at the number of ideas with at least one collapse/failure, as well
as number of collapses/failures per idea. These measures showed low levels of inter-coder consistency and did not
predict performance.
12 Note that in the 5/15 treatment the last idea is launched after the transition to execution (6 : 22> 5 : 00, one-sided
t−test: p= 0.089) and in 10/10 and 15/5 treatments the last idea is launched before the transition (07 : 34< 10 : 00,
p= 0.014 and 08 : 05< 15 : 00, p= 0.000). An alternative measure of time allocation between ideation and execution is
the number of ideas explored after a successful stacking. Trying new ideas after the first successful stacking indicates
a broader exploration of the design space, as opposed to stopping and polishing an idea that works. Similar to the
time-to-last idea, there was a mild trend of exploring more new ideas after a successful stacking with later transition
time, however the trend was not significant (Exog treatment means: 0.49, 0.62, 0,75; Trend test: p= 0.239).
13 There were treatment differences in other process variables, however those process variables failed to predict
performance, so we do not discuss them here. See Appendix B for the complete list.
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Figure 3 Activity times and design performance
Endog
(Pooled)
Exog
0 2 4 6 8 10
Time elapsed from start (min)
(a) Mean time-to-first idea
Endog
(Pooled)
Exog
0 2 4 6 8 10
Time elapsed from start (min)
(b) Mean time-to-first stacking
Endog
(Pooled)
Exog
0 2 4 6 8 10
Time elapsed from start (min)
(c) Mean time-to-first collapse
0
5
10
15
20
25
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 ($
)
0 5 10 15 20
Time elapsed from start (min)
(d) Time-to-first idea
0
5
10
15
20
25
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 ($
)
0 5 10 15 20
Time elapsed from start (min)
(e) Time-to-first stacking
0
5
10
15
20
25
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 ($
)
0 5 10 15 20
Time elapsed from start (min)
(f) Time-to-first collapse
Note. Figures (a), (b) and (c) show mean times to first idea, stacking and collapse by treatment. Figures (d), (e)
and (f) show the relationships between those variables and performance. The dotted line indicates locally weighted
scatterplot smoothing (bandwidth = 0.8).
Endogenous transition is associated with longer time-to-first build and stacking. For example, for
the time-to-first stacking the Endogenous treatment is associated with a delay of 2.86 minutes
(p < 0.01).14
Correlation analysis reveals that the tracked count variables (number of construction ideas, stack-
ings and collapses) are not significantly related to design performance (all ρ < 0.15, all p > 0.1).
However, times-to-first idea, stacking and collapse are associated with greatly improved perfor-
mance, as shown in figure 3d)-3f). In particular, the ability to create a viable structure early on is
associated with improved performance (ρ=−0.308, p < 0.001). Performance is also improved when
the first coin stacking occurs early on (ρ=−0.349, p < 0.001) and when the first failure occurs early
on (ρ=−0.250, p= 0.014). Similar results were obtained in regression analysis after controlling for
individual differences.15
4.5.2. Do process variables explain treatment differences in performance? Our
results so far indicate that both decision control and delays in important activities explain large
14 Additional analysis revealed that the delays in first idea and stacking were also associated with reduced exploration
measured as the number of ideas after a successful stacking (ρ=−0.33, p < 0.01) and with reduced number of successful
stackings on new ideas after a successful stacking (ρ=−0.28, p < 0.01). Both those variables were significantly lower
in the Endogenous treatment (p < 0.01 and p= 0.024) and both were also significantly related to payoff (ρ= 0.18, p=
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Table 3 Relationships between performance and process variables
Dep.var.: Performance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exog (pooled) 3.653*** 3.747*** 4.052*** 4.170*** 3.174** 2.379* 4.725***
(1.323) (1.356) (1.362) (1.333) (1.294) (1.267) (1.518)
# Ideas 0.434
(0.665)
# Stackings -0.143
(0.206)
# Collapses -0.477*
(0.255)
Time-to-first idea (min) -0.542***
(0.161)
Time-to-first stacking (min) -0.465***
(0.120)
Time-to-first collapse (min) -0.275**
(0.127)
Constant -4.594 -5.632 -4.003 -4.031 -2.542 -5.772 -4.341
(3.971) (4.101) (4.147) (3.914) (3.809) (4.143) (4.239)
Observations 112 108 108 108 108 107 90
Variation explained by process variable
NA NA NA NA 17.75% 34.69% 11.26%
Note. Tobit coefficients are reported. Performance ($) is the dependent variable. Age, Engineering major (Yes/No)
and gender are controlled for. Time variables are measured in minutes elapsed from the beginning of the design
task. In columns 6 and 7 the number of observations is reduced: 1 participant never attempted a stacking and 18
participants never experienced a collapse. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
portions of performance differences. We have also seen that endogenous decision control is asso-
ciated with delays in each of those activities. However, it is unclear how much of the treatment
differences in performance are explained by the process delays, and how much remains unexplained.
To examine the relative contribution of the process delays to the performance gap we regressed
performance on both the Endogenous treatment dummy variable and the process variables. Table
3 shows the Tobit coefficients and the percentages of common variation in performance explained
by the process variables.16
0.051 and ρ= 0.19, p= 0.042). That is, delayed physical ideation in the Endogenous treatment results in insufficient
exploration of the design space leading to reduced performance.
15 To test for potential non-linearity in the relationship between the timing of ideas and performance we created
variables for the number of ideas in each 2 minute interval of the 20 minute period. This alternative specification
confirmed that more ideas led to better final performance when those ideas were explored in the first two minutes
(p < 0.001), whereas the number of ideas in later periods does not affect performance. Similar results were obtained
for 3, 4, 5, 6 minute windows, highest p= 0.022. We conducted similar robustness analyses for times-to-first stacking
and collapse, both of which were consistent with the presented results.
16 The percentages were calculated as follows. We first calculated the marginal effects of the process variables and
of the Endogenous treatment. We then calculated the predicted performance differences using those marginal effects
and average treatment values of the process variables. This was done by taking the ratio of the predicted difference
between the Endogenous and the pooled Exogenous treatment that is due to the process variable and the total
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Columns (2)-(4) of table 3 confirm that the count variables (# ideas, # stackings, # collapses) do
not explain the advantage of exogenous transitions. Among the time variables (columns 5-7) time-
to-first stacking has the greatest explanatory power: one minute of delay costs the designer $0.37
(Average marginal effect, p < 0.01) explaining about 35% of the performance variation. Time-to-
first idea is also significantly related to performance explaining about 18% of performance variation
(p < 0.01). The performance effect of first failure is somewhat weaker, explaining only about 11
% of the combined performance variation (p= 0.033). Note also that adding the time-to-first idea
and time-to-first stacking to the list of regressors lowers the magnitude and the significance level of
the Exogenous treatment coefficient (highest p−value is 0.058 in column 6). That is, the treatment
effect on performance is partially explained by the delays in those activities.
In sum, early build, testing and even failures all have positive effects on design performance and
explain up to one third of the treatment differences. With the endogenous decision control those
activities are delayed by several minutes causing significantly reduced performance.
4.6. Design Process: Discussion
The analysis of the micro-structure of the design effort highlights some behavioral manifestations
of the endogenous decision control. When endowed with full scheduling autonomy designers launch
their first construction, attempt their first test and experience their first failure with a substantial
delay, all of which leads to greatly reduced design performance.
The delays in physical activities explain a significant share of the performance advantage. In con-
trast, different Exogenous allocations of time to phases do not affect these design activities. Also,
pure count measures (as opposed to timing) of design activities do not explain performance dif-
ferences. Taken together these results confirm some conventional wisdoms and contradict another,
commonly associated with good design practice. In particular, designers are often advised to “get
physical fast” (go rapidly to first build) and “fail fast” (test early), both of which are supported
by our results. Also, designers are often told that in the ideation stage “Quantity is Quality” (the
more ideas, the better). This is not supported by our data.
We also find that the negative effects of delays in physical development do not disappear fully
once the transition time is fixed exogenously. In fact the delays explain about one third of the
performance difference between the (pooled) Exogenous and the Endogenous treatments. This has
two important implications for managing product development. First, managers may be able to
improve new product performance by imposing strict time bounds on ideation and by limiting
extensions of the exploratory period. Second, design performance may benefit from an additional
predicted difference (that is due to both the treatment dummy and the process variable). For robustness we also
tested several alternative specifications that included multiple process variables, discretized process variables and
quadratic specifications, all of which confirmed our results.
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requirement on design teams to build early physical prototypes of their ideas. We present new
evidence for the validity of the latter recommendation in section 6 where we reexamine the effect
of early physical build/test and the effects of prototyping on performance.
The benefits of early prototyping and testing have been studied extensively in the product devel-
opment and project management literature (Iansiti 1995, Thomke 1998, Dow et al. 2009, Parvan
et al. 2015, and references there). However, the literature is less explicit about the relationship
between early physical representation of design ideas and scheduling autonomy. In fact, the liter-
ature sometimes considers “flexible development processes”, “failing fast” and “get physical fast”
to be part of the “lean” development paradigm and does not differentiate between decision control
and process-related recommendations to design teams (c.f. Iansiti 1995, Maccormack et al. 2001,
Biazzo 2009). Our findings suggest that firms need to be cautious when applying “lean” ideas to
their design projects. In our data scheduling flexibility had negative design consequences, whereas
strict bounds on ideation resulted in earlier physical build and testing leading to greatly improved
performance.
The above analysis and discussion leave several process-related questions unanswered. First, we
cannot determine with the extant data whether the delays in time-to-first build and test are the
immediate cause of poor performance (in which case they may be directly addressed by managers)
or if they are a manifestation of some latent cognitive effect of the endogenous decision control.
Second, while we were able to uncover several drivers of design performance the gap between
Exogenous and Endogenous transition groups remains even after controlling for design activities,
endogenously determined transition times and individual differences (to the extent that we could
identify and measure those factors). This suggests a more careful examination of the psychological
drivers of performance differences.
Two psychological effects of endogenous decision control are suggested by the literature. Endoge-
nous decision-making could result in the experience of choice overload (Iyengar and Lepper 2000),
or (more generally) cognitive overload caused by the complexity of the task (Dennis et al. 1996,
1999). In particular, being preoccupied with scheduling tasks may detract from direct value-adding
activities leading to poor performance. Or, alternatively a fixed transition point may provide the
designer with a motivational boost by signaling the approaching phase transition. Recent work
in goal-setting theory has shown that milestone progress checks that give individuals feedback on
their advancement to a superior goal (here: design success) may lead to better work outcomes
(Locke and Latham 2002, Fishbach et al. 2006). Indeed, exogenously imposed transitions may be
perceived by designers as process goals improving self-efficacy and design performance.
To explore these possibilities the next section will examine three new treatments. If early building
and testing is the key to better performance, we may be able to enhance performance by sharing
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this wisdom with designers. This could be expected to encourage earlier building and testing, and
potentially enhance performance. If cognitive load is the reason for deteriorated performance, then
relieving the designer of the scheduling duties by asking her to pre-commit to a transition time
before the task begins should exhibit enhanced performance. If framing the process as proceeding
in phases is the key to better performance, even if timing is chosen endogenously, then we should
be able to enhance performance by demanding a minimally performing deliverable that clearly
punctuates a phase, prior to allowing a transition.
5. Experiment 2: Alternative Scenarios with Endogenous Transition
We examine three new scenarios that allow a clean test of some of the recommendations developed
in section 4, help determine the relative importance of the psychological drivers of performance,
and explore whether improved performance can be achieved without imposing an exogenous time
schedule. In particular, we examine transition regimes in which (1) transitions are endogenous but
early build and testing are encouraged, (2) transitions are endogenous but designers are asked
to choose binding transition times before they start working, and (3) transitions are endogenous
but are permitted only after a demonstration of a minimum performance prototype. Scenario 1
re-examines our process-related recommendation discussed in section 4 (of encouraging early build
and testing).17 Scenario 2 tests whether relieving designers of scheduling duties while they are
working on the design task is the main driving force. Scenario 3 reflects a compartmentalized
“stage-gate”-like regime with the design task clearly framed as a phased process.
5.1. Experimental design
The setup of experiment 2 was similar to experiment 1: subjects worked on the same design task,
were given 20 minutes for completion and the task was divided into the ideation and execution
phases. 95 subjects were recruited for experiment 2. The treatments resembled the three scenarios
described above (the instruction text is reproduced in the supplementary document). In the first
new treatment (henceforth referred to as the Nudge treatment) we examined the effects of encour-
aging early build and testing. Designers transitioned endogenously and were free to pursue any
design strategy and choose the transition time as they saw fit. However, they were advised to begin
early with physical build and testing. They were also informed that previous experiments indicated
a positive relationship between early build/testing and performance. In the second (Pre-commit)
treatment we asked designers to commit to a transition time before they began working. The third
(Prototype) treatment was identical to Endog with the exception that transition into execution
was allowed only after designers were able to demonstrate a minimum viable construction (worth
17 Note that sharing information with the designers may encourage a sense of urgency about certain tasks, but would
not clearly frame the creative process as a phased process.
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at least $1, corresponding to the 25th percentile of the performance distribution in experiment 1).
Designers who were not able to demonstrate a minimum viable construction were not allowed to
transition into execution receiving a payoff of $0.18
5.2. Experimental results
5.2.1. Performance comparisons Design performance in each new treatment is not signif-
icantly different from the (pooled) Exogenous transitions (Rank sum tests, all p > 0.40). Mean
performance in the Nudge (Pre-commit, Prototype) treatment is $5.53 ($6.07, $6.67). That is,
each of the treatments is associated with improved design performance, relative to the Endogenous
treatment ($3.39). However, while requiring a prototype and asking to pre-commit to a transition
time leads to significant improvements (Rank Sum tests, p= 0.023 and p= 0.025, respectively) the
advantage of the Nudge treatment is only marginally significant (p= 0.089).
The performance advantage of the new treatments relative to Endog is partly driven by fewer
design failures. However the differences in the proportion of failures are not statistically significant
(Probit regressions, p > 0.26). That is, Exogenous 5/15 and 10/10 are the only regimes with the
failure rate being significantly reduced, relative to the Endogenous base case (c.f. columns 1 and 2
of table 2). Performance results conditional on non-failure are similar to the unconditional perfor-
mance results. In particular, Nudge improves performance given non-failure, but not significantly
(Rank Sum test, $6.86, p = 0.249), whereas Pre-commit and Prototype are significantly better,
relative to the Endogenous treatment ($7.77 and $8.90, p= 0.021 and p < 0.01, respectively)
Column 1 of Table 4 reports Tobit regression coefficients with performance as the dependent
variable (baseline treatment: Endog). The average performance advantages of the Nudge and the
Pre-commit treatments are $2.05 (p = 0.082) and $2.03 (p = 0.078), respectively.19 However, the
highest performance level is exhibited in the Prototype treatment (average marginal effect: $3.20,
p= 0.010). In columns (2)-(4) we control for the effects of the process variables that have previously
been shown to affect design performance. Consistent with our previous findings one minute of delay
in the first physical build (first stacking, first failure) is associated with performance drops of $0.41
($0.34, $0.30, all p < 0.01). After controlling for the time-to-first build, test and collapse Prototype
retains its position as the best performing treatment with the treatment effects being significant
at p < 0.01 in each specification. In contrast, the performance effects of Nudge and Pre-commit are
18 In all treatments (experiment 1 and 2) participants were paid based solely on their final performance; prototype
performance was not incentivized.
19 Pre-commit had a higher percentage of engineers (whose performance was significantly better), which explains
the discrepancy between the effect sizes and the significance levels in Rank Sum tests and those obtained in Tobit
regressions. In the latter college major was controlled for.
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less robust to inclusion of the process variables. The implications of this result will be discussed
below.20
5.2.2. Design process The new treatments exhibit some differences in the activities engaged
by the designers. In particular, the number of ideas in Nudge and Pre-commit is related to perfor-
mance (ρ= 0.321, p= 0.084 and ρ= 0.500, p < 0.01). We did not see a positive relationship between
idea quantity and performance in any of the remaining treatments (Prototype, Endog, Exog). That
is, “Quantity=Quality” is not uniformly supported, but rather depends on the transition regime
in question.
There were also some difference in the timing of the activities. The time-to-first idea is reduced by
only 11 seconds in Nudge, relative to the Endogenous base case scenario (Rank Sum test, p= 0.676),
while the time-to-first stacking is reduced by 2.35 minutes (p= 0.081). In contrast, times-to-first
idea and times-to-first stacking remain unchanged in the Pre-commit and Prototype treatments,
relative to the Endogenous base case. That is, front-loaded ideation (in the form of earlier tests)
is both a unique feature of the Exogenous regime and a behavior that can be encouraged by
communicating its advantages to designers.
We have seen previously that approximately one third of the performance gap between the
Exogenous and the Endogenous treatments could be traced back to the process delays. We repeat
the process analysis for the new set of treatments. The bottom panel of table 4 reports the results
with the Endogenous treatment used as the comparison benchmark in each case. As before, these
comparisons are based on the average delays in each treatment and the average marginal effects
computed using the Tobit estimates. Comparisons for which the treatment effects and the fitted
value differences have opposite signs are denoted by “NA”.
We first replicate the comparison of Endog and Exog using the new estimates of the process
variable effects.21 We find the portion of the performance gap explained by the delays to be con-
sistent with our previous results. The time-to-first stacking has the strongest explanatory power
accounting for approximately 1/3 of the performance differences. Similar to Exog, approximately
1/3 of the performance advantage of Nudge over Endog is explained by the time-to-first stacking.
The Nudge dummy variable becomes non-significant after the timing variable is added to the list
of regressors. That is, the treatment effect of Nudge is substantially weakened after controlling for
20 When coding the video data from Experiment 2 we only recorded a subset of the original coding variables. The
subset was selected based on the variables that were found to drive performance differences in experiment 1 (Time-
to-first build, stacking, collapse, as well as the structural characteristics of the ideas). Due to the simplified coding
procedure we expected less variability in the coding, so we reduced the number of coders from 3 to 1.
21 The percentages for Exog/Endog comparisons in table 4 are slightly different than those computed in table 3. This
is driven by the differences in the marginal effects of the process variables that are estimated using the original 4
treatments (experiment 1) in table 3 and the full data set (experiment 1+2) in table 4.
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time-to-first stacking. In contrast to the Nudge treatment, the advantage of the Pre-commit and
the Prototype treatments appears to be largely driven by other factors than the process delays.
For both Pre-commit and Prototype the delays accounted for only about 1/6 of the performance
differences.
Table 4 Experiment 2: Treatment comparisons and timing of activities
Dep Var: Performance (1) (2) (3) (4)
Exog (pooled) 3.584** 3.119** 2.498* 4.264***
(1.383) (1.352) (1.367) (1.584)
Nudge 2.937* 3.120* 2.241 2.871
(1.679) (1.629) (1.634) (1.994)
Pre-commit 2.908* 3.112* 2.429 4.103**
(1.642) (1.594) (1.593) (1.874)
Prototype 4.367** 4.951*** 3.856*** 6.587***
(1.684) (1.643) (1.645) (2.019)
Time-to-first idea (min) -0.490***
(0.114)
Time-to-first stacking (min) -0.416***
(0.094)
Time-to-first collapse (min) -0.400***
(0.104)
Constant -0.479 2.293 2.717 1.295
(2.988) (2.906) (3.010) (3.549)
Observations 205 199 198 154
Variation explained by process variable
Endog / Exog 17.19% 32.61% 17.36%
Endog / Nudge 3.01% 32.45% 28.90%
Endog / Pre-commit NA 17.82% 7.25%
Endog / Prototype NA 17.04% NA
Note. Tobit coefficients are reported. Performance ($) is the dependent variable. Age, Engineering major (Yes/No)
and gender are controlled for. Time variables are measured in minutes elapsed from the beginning of the design
task. Comparisons where treatment effects and fitted value differences had opposite signs are denoted by “NA”.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
In sum, experiment 2 confirms that early build and particularly early testing are associated
with enhanced performance. However, encouraging early build and testing does not close the entire
performance gap between endogenous and exogenous transitions. Similarly, reducing the cognitive
load by asking designers to make an ex-ante time allocation improves performance but does not
explain the entire gap. In contrast, requiring a minimum performance prototype closes the entire
gap.
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5.3. Discussion
The new treatments help refine our understanding of the drivers of the negative performance effects
of endogenous decision control. In particular, our results indicate that the performance effects of
early build and testing account for a significant share of the performance differences resulting from
varying the decision control. That is, “Get physical fast” is supported, both as a direct contributor
to performance but also as an observable manifestation of a more latent cognitive effect that one
can influence with managerial regimes.
While accounting for a significant share of the performance gap nudging designers to front-load
the first physical build and testing does not close all of the gap. That is, while some of treatment
differences in performance are delay-driven, it is not the single dominant factor. Similarly, cognitive
load remains a viable influence on the creative process, but not in isolation. Choosing ex ante
and pre-committing to a time split closes some of the performance gap between exogenous and
endogenous transitions, but an unexplained portion remains. In contrast, requiring a minimum
viable prototype fully closes the performance gap suggesting that endogenous transitions can indeed
result in good performance when the design task is explicitly framed as a phased process with a
concrete deliverable punctuating the transition.
Similar to exogenous transitions, the intermediate objective to build a prototype may be per-
ceived by designers as a process goal improving their self-efficacy and their design performance (c.f.
Locke and Latham 2002). The advantage of the prototype requirement may be caused by strong
motivational effects provided not only by a specific goal, but also by the immediate evaluation of
and feedback on the design progress.
While these alternative endogenous regimes improved mean performance each of them was asso-
ciated with increased risk, relative to the exogenous treatments. In fact design failures were sig-
nificantly more frequent in each treatment with endogenous transition, relative to the exogenous
regimes with short and halfway transitions. That is, while risk-neutral decision-makers may choose
endogenous transitions and allow transition after a demonstration of a prototype, risk-averse deci-
sion makers should avoid any regimes with endogenous transition.
Taken together our results so far suggest that the clear compartmentalization of the design
process into exploratory and execution phases leads to good design performance. The phasing can
be imposed either explicitly by setting the length of the phases or by demanding a prototype that
exceeds a minimum performance hurdle. Our process results indicate that the quantity of ideas
matters less than the timing when ideas are launched. We next investigate the role of idea quality
for design performance and its contribution to design success (or failure), relative to the role of
selecting and implementing the chosen idea.
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6. The role of idea generation, selection and implementation
We use the structural properties of ideas to group similar ideas across designers, construct a
measure of idea performance and decompose individual performance into 3 components: (1) the
average quality of generated ideas, (2) the ability to select the best idea, and (3) the ability to
create the best representation of that idea. Each of these steps undoubtedly contributes to design
performance, but it is not clear which steps are most sensitive to active management of the creative
process.
The investigation of these design activities is partly motivated by the lack of experimental and
empirical research on later, more physical stages of product development. The experimental results
presented in this section reveal that the relative importance of ideation and execution components
in fact depends on the chosen transition regime, suggesting that a focus on creative metrics alone
may hide those interactive aspects.
6.1. Methodology
Having recorded the codes for each idea that designers attempted as well as the payoffs earned with
each idea that was submitted we can characterize the creative micro-process of each designer.22
We begin by computing the idea quality score for each idea that was submitted, by averaging
the payoffs obtained with that idea. We then use idea quality as an input for three metrics: idea
generation, selection, implementation. The idea generation score is calculated as the average quality
of all ideas a designer has attempted. The selection score is calculated as the difference between the
average quality of the explored ideas and the quality of the submitted idea. The implementation
score is calculated as the difference between one’s own final payoff and the average quality score of
the submitted idea over all subjects.
By construction, the sum of the three metrics is the final payoff Πi obtained by participant i:
Πi =
(
E[Πj|j ∈ Ji]
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Quality of generated ideas
+
(
E[Πk|k ∈Ki]−E[Πj|j ∈ Ji]
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection ability
+
(
Πi−E[Πk|k ∈Ki]
)
,︸ ︷︷ ︸
Implementation ability
where Ji is the subset of participants who have submitted the ideas that i has considered. The
expectation E[Πj|j ∈ Ji] is taken over all ideas that i has explored and over all participants in
Ji. Ki is the subset of participants who have submitted the same idea that i has submitted.
The expectation E[Πk|k ∈Ki] is taken over all participants in Ki. Because the three performance
22 We construct what is sometimes referred to in the innovation literature as the “idea pool” – a collection of ideas with
attributes assigned to each idea, such as the number of people that engaged that idea, the idea-specific performance
distribution etc. Idea pools have been used in several theoretical and experimental studies in the innovation and
product development literature (Kornish and Ulrich 2011, Erat 2012, Erat and Krishnan 2012, Girotra et al. 2010).
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metrics sum up to the participant’s overall payoff we will be able to measure what percentage of
the treatment difference in performance is caused by differences in the quality of generated ideas,
by the difference in selection ability and/or by the difference in implementation ability.
6.2. Results
Our idea pool consists of 79 submitted construction ideas (counting ideas identified by at least one
coder). The most popular idea was submitted 24 times in experiment 1 and 17 times in experiment
2. One traditional measure of creativity, the novelty of an idea relative to the ideas generated
by others is not rewarded in our setting. In fact, there is no significant relationship between idea
“popularity”, i.e. the number of participants submitting an idea, and idea quality (experiment 1:
ρ= 0.08, experiment 2: ρ=−0.10, all p > 0.1).
Next we investigate the extent to which the ability to generate ideas, to select an idea and to
produce the best version of that idea drive performance differences between treatments. We use
Rank Sum tests when making comparisons that involve the full sample of subjects, as well as OLS
regressions, particularly when examining subject subpopulations.
6.2.1. Treatment comparisons We do not find significant differences in any of the three met-
rics (idea generation, selection, implementation) between the three Exogenous treatments (Rank
sum test: p > 0.147). Further, there are no significant differences along the ideation or selection met-
rics between the Endogenous and (pooled) Exogenous treatments (Rank sum test: p > 0.196). There
is, however a significant difference in implementation when comparing the (pooled) Exogenous
treatment to the Endogenous treatment (difference in means: 1.282, Rank Sum test: p = 0.039).
Similar results were obtained in OLS regressions after controlling for the demographic variables.
Decomposing the performance gap between the Exogenous and Endogenous treatments reveals
that ideation explains 30.59%, selection explains 17.30% and implementation explains 52.11% of
the overall performance differences. That is, ideation-driven metrics play a subordinate role in
explaining the advantage of Exogenous transitions, relative to the implementation metrics.
We repeat the decomposition of the overall performance gap for the treatments examined in
experiment 2. The comparison baseline is the Endogenous treatment in each case. Our comparisons
indicate that Nudge is associated with a marginally significant improvement in selection (Rank Sum
test, p = 0.067), but not in ideation (p = 0.155) or implementation (p = 0.255). Neither ideation
nor selection are improved in Pre-commit, relative to Endog (p= 0.386 and p= 0.273). However,
Pre-commit is associated with significantly improved implementation (p = 0.038). Prototype is
associated with significantly improved ideation (p= 0.020) and improved selection (p= 0.037) but
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not implementation (p= 0.193). Similar results were obtained in regression analysis controlling for
the individual differences.23
The portions of the overall performance gap explained by the three metrics are summarized in the
left half of figure 4. To improve precision and to account for the individual differences this analysis
uses OLS predicted values rather than the raw data. The contribution profiles reveal two patterns
in our data. First, the portions explained by the ideation, selection and implementation metrics are
similar in the Exogenous transitions and in Pre-commit. This suggests that the implementation
advantage of Exogenous transitions is driven mainly by the ex ante allocation of the time to phases,
rather than by the exogeneity of the time constraint. Second, selection and, to a greater extent
ideation drive the performance advantage of Prototype with ideation explaining almost 60% of
the performance gap to the Endogenous treatment. In fact, ideation performance in Prototype
is significantly improved not only relative to the Endogenous treatment, but also relative to the
Exogenous treatment (Wald test, p= 0.035).
In sum, while the treatments with ex ante fixed transition (Exogenous and Pre-commit) lead
to better physical implementation of the chosen idea, treatments in which the transition decision
is made “on-the-go” (Nudge and Prototype) improve the quality of ideas and the ability to select
good ideas, relative to the Endogenous base case.
6.2.2. Alternative metrics To understand the role of idea selection the above analysis was
repeated for the subset of designers who explored at least 2 distinct design ideas (our previous
analysis may downplay the role of selection because the selection score is 0 whenever a designer
explores only one design idea).
We find that restricting the sample to subjects with at least two ideas puts a greater weight
on selection. Selection is driving a substantial portion of the performance gap between Endog
and Nudge and of the gap between Endog and Prototype (37.93% and 43.84%; Rank Sum tests:
p = 0.155 and p < 0.01, respectively). By contrast, selection explains no more than 20% of the
advantage of Exog and Pre-commit. The right panel of figure 4 repeats the decomposition of the
performance differences using OLS predicted values rather than the raw data. The results indicate
that after controlling for the demographic variables selection explains approximately 40% of the
23 There were several instances when an idea was attempted but not submitted by anyone. The reported results
exclude such ideas. For robustness we re-ran the analysis with an imputed score assigned to such discarded ideas.
The imputation was done by regressing the mean payoffs of the submitted ideas on their structural characteristics
and then by generating predicted scores for the discarded ideas. With this specification the differences between
Exogenous treatments remained non-significant while the ideation and the selection advantage of Prototype remained
unchanged (by construction, the implementation metrics is unaffected by the discarded ideas). We also ran the analysis
considering only ideas that were submitted by at least 2 subjects to account for possible noise in unique idea quality
measures. The results were similar to the reported analysis. The implementation advantage of Exog (difference in
means: 1.44, Rank Sum test: p= 0.026) and the ideation advantage of Prototype could be confirmed (difference in
means: 1.70, Rank Sum test: p= 0.048).
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Figure 4 Idea generation, selection and implementation contribution to performance gap
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Note. The bars indicate the shares of the performance gap explained by each of the three metrics (ideation, selection,
implementation). The percentages are obtained by first computing OLS marginal effects for each metrics with Endog
as the baseline and then by dividing the marginal effect on each of the metrics by the sum of those marginal effects.
Age, gender and engineering major are controlled for.
performance gap between Endog and Nudge and 48% of the performance gap between Endog
and Prototype. By contrast, selection fails to explain the performance advantage of Exog or the
advantage of Pre-commit even in this restricted sample, accounting for at most 20% of the gap.
Selection (as defined in this paper) can only be a performance driver when there are quality
differences between the explored ideas and the submitted idea. Therefore, it may be informative
to examine the temporal sequence of ideas and the quality of each idea by treatment.
The left panel of figure 5 shows that Prototype exhibits a substantial quality improvement as
one goes from the first to the second idea (mean difference: $3.85, two sample t−test, p < 0.01).
Subjects do not substantially improve idea quality as they explore new ideas in any other treatment.
In fact, in the Endogenous treatment subsequent ideas are on average $0.19 worse than initial
ideas. Further, designers in Prototype produce significantly better second ideas, relative to the
Endogenous treatment (OLS treatment coefficient: 3.36, p = 0.023). However, as shown in the
right panel of figure 5 even those designers in Prototype who explore only one idea achieve higher
ideation scores relative to the Endogenous base case (OLS treatment coefficient: 2.57, p= 0.028).
In fact, Prototype is also better than the Exogenous treatment (Wald test, p= 0.054).
Lastly, the quality of submitted ideas is significantly improved in Prototype relative to the
Endogenous (OLS treatment coefficient: 3.21, p < 0.01) and also relative to the Exogenous treat-
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Figure 5 Idea quality by treatment
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ment (Wald test, p= 0.018). In sum, the positive ideation effect of Prototype extends to compar-
isons of the initial idea, the subsequent ideas, and the submitted idea.
6.3. Discussion
Using the pool of all design ideas attempted and/or submitted in our experiment we have shown
that physical execution of an idea explained most of the performance advantage of exogenous
decision control. In contrast, the average quality of ideas and the ability to select good ideas was
not affected by the decision control. This result is new in the literature on creativity and innovation
that has been almost exclusively focusing on early ideation stages of the process. In contrast, the
advantage of Prototype was driven mainly by idea quality. Initial ideas, average explored ideas
and submitted ideas were all improved, relative to endogenous transitions, in fact idea quality
was improved even relative to exogenous transitions. Taken together, these results suggest that
the relative contribution of ideation, selection and implementation components interacts with the
chosen transition regime. A focus on ideation-driven or implementation-driven metrics alone may
therefore lead to poor design outcomes.
In the presence of the prototype requirement designers who attempted only one idea exhibited
superior idea quality scores, relative to the Endogenous base case scenario. At the same time, those
designers who did not submit their initial idea (which was typically used as a prototype) frequently
had low quality initial ideas, but were able to significantly improve idea quality later on. This
suggests that the prototyping requirement may trigger a more conscious evaluation of the design
approach, leading to improved allocation of the development time.
The finding that individuals are able to discover better ideas when required to prototype is also
in line with the findings in the problem-solving and brainstorming literatures. Cognitive evaluation
theory (Deci and Ryan 1985) posits that individuals feel more competent and capable of completing
a task when they experience a feeling of being “on track” which would suggest that intermediate
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milestones may increase workers’ intrinsic motivation by enabling that experience. Positive effects
of an expected evaluation on creative performance have been found in a verbal task (Shalley and
Perry-Smith 2001). In our experiment the prototype requirement may be seen by designers as a
milestone check providing progress feedback and giving them a feeling of being in control leading
to improved idea quality.
7. Concluding remarks
This is the first experimental attempt to our knowledge to study the design performance effect of
time allocations to ideation and execution phases in an innovation task, and the decision rights
for choosing transition times between them. We used a controlled laboratory experiment with
individual designers working on an open-ended design challenge to create a physical product subject
to clear and measurable performance objectives.
The main insight from our analysis is that design performance suffers when all decisions are left in
designers’ hands. Imposing constraints on the design process, either in form of exogenous transition
times or in form of a concrete transition point deliverable, outperformed giving designers full
decision-making autonomy. This is surprising given that putting decision rights where information
is richest, and giving individuals control over their work are expected to be beneficial based on the
job design literature.
Another surprise was that within the Exogenous treatments we saw no significant mean perfor-
mance differences in transition time. One might intuitively expect that since both ideation and
execution are important, a transition at the halfway point might be best. Instead, the average
performance was constant regardless of transition time, but there was a risk-return trade-off. Vari-
ance goes up with the length of the ideation period, mostly driven by a high incidence of failures
for late transitions. That is, although a risk neutral firm would be indifferent, a risk-averse firm
would prefer shorter ideation and longer implementation periods with the converse being true for
a risk-seeking firm.
We analyzed the gap between the Exogenous and Endogenous treatments by looking at the micro-
structure of the creative process, and found that the quantity of explored ideas did not consistently
predict performance. The conventional logic, “Quantity = Quality when brainstorming” featured
mixed results in our experiments, and is probably not uniformly true. In contrast, the timing of
activities differed between the Exogenous and Endogenous treatments, at least partially explaining
the results. Specifically, delays in important activities such as the appearance of the first idea, the
first test and even the first failure were significantly related to poor design performance (but did
not explain all of the performance differences). So “Get Physical Fast” and “Fail Fast” are robustly
good recommendations, but do not in isolation explain performance gaps.
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The results around rapid build/test align with conventional design wisdom, but the independent
effect of an exogenous deadline is less intuitive. To better understand the advantage of exogenous
deadlines we examined several alternative scenarios in which transitions were designer-determined,
but the transition process or the information provided was changed. We found that delays in phys-
ical construction could be prevented by encouraging early build/testing, but that alone was not
sufficient for good performance. In contrast, allowing transition only after designers were able to
present a minimum performance prototype led to performance levels on par with exogenous tran-
sitions. However, the prototyping requirement lead to significantly increased failure risk, relative
to Exogenous regimes with early and halfway transition.
Given the emphasis on idea generation in the creativity literature, we attempted to separate
out the impact of the quality of the ideas generated on performance, relative to idea selection
and implementation. The relative contribution of ideation, selection and implementation varied
by treatment, with each of them being significant in one or more treatments. So, all three can be
vehicles for success or failure (and none can be ignored).
Our paper addresses the class of projects with a hard launch date, increased costs of exploring
new ideas in execution, objective, easily measurable performance metrics and individual designers
or strong team leaders. Our boundary contains many physical, engineering products in such indus-
tries as automotive, aerospace, medical devices, computers, industrial equipment, and component
engineering for B2B products. Our findings do not directly inform other contexts, however survey
data from 14 cross-functional teams (76 students with engineering, business, and art and design
background) who spent 12 weeks designing and developing physical consumer products suggest
that some of our findings may carry over to broader settings. The transition from ideation to exe-
cution was endogenously determined by those teams. Consistent with our findings, the two most
frequently named obstacles to design success were delays in physical build (mentioned by 55% of
respondents) and planning/scheduling difficulties (mentioned by 18% of respondents).24
Our results have several managerial implications. Managers should not endow design teams with
full decision control, but rather exogenously impose a constraint that clearly signals a punctuation
point between the ideation and execution phases of a creative project. Two ways to impose such
external requirements are to exogenously fix transition times or to demand a concrete, performance-
oriented deliverable prior to allowing the team to transition. The latter alternative is particularly
relevant for product development settings in which managers are not able to set or enforce strict
time schedules, or for settings where external reviews exist but transitions are de facto endoge-
nous.25
24 The data and the detailed description of the design projects are presented in the supplementary document.
25 There is frequently a high level of information asymmetry between a design team and the reviewers in a phase
review, who are often more senior managers responsible for managing a portfolio of many projects. In such cases the
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Risk-averse firms will prefer exogenous transitions with longer execution times, while risk seeking
firms can either impose shorter ideation times, or they can leave the decision control to design teams
and request minimum performance prototypes. Regardless of the transition regime managers should
both encourage and look for early build and test, because these can directly help performance as
well as being markers of a productive inner design logic.
potential exists for a team to strongly influence the reviewers’ decisions by strategically choosing the information it
presents.
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Appendix
A. Participant demographics
Table 5 Demographic variables (treatment means)
College major
Treatment
Social sci, arts,
humanities
Bus, law,
econ
Sci,
med
Engineering,
architecture
Age
Gender
(1=f)
Performance
($)
Endog 0.36 0.14 0.41 0.09 23.27 0.64 3.39
5/15 0.28 0.13 0.52 0.07 21.52 0.39 5.17
10/10 0.48 0.06 0.23 0.23 22.52 0.56 6.28
15/5 0.41 0.03 0.41 0.14 22.07 0.52 5.38
Nudge 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.17 20.57 0.65 5.53
Pre-commit 0.16 0.27 0.25 0.28 22.63 0.63 6.07
Prototype 0.25 0.17 0.38 0.20 21.84 0.31 6.67
Total 0.31 0.16 0.35 0.17 22.09 0.53 5.49
B. Experiment 1, design activity variables
Table 6 Design activity variables: summary statistics
Treatment means Treatment means
5/15 10/10 15/5 p−value Exog Endog p−value
Count Variables
# ideas 1.79 1.89 2.09 0.229 1.94 1.63 0.067
# elements 3.89 3.82 4.09 0.312 3.94 3.69 0.318
# all collapses 2.56 2.90 2.46 0.982 2.63 1.80 0.033
# coin collapses 1.65 2.05 1.82 0.865 1.85 1.18 0.029
# other collapses 0.90 0.86 0.65 0.930 0.79 0.61 0.248
# all coin stackings 5.65 5.51 5.95 0.895 5.71 4.38 0.016
# successful stackings 4.00 3.46 4.13 0.738 3.87 3.19 0.140
Time variables
Time-to-first idea 02:51 04:36 02:55 0.704 3:28 4:39 0.017
Time-to-first collapse 06:32 08:06 07:25 0.477 7:26 9:24 0.091
Time-to-first stacking 05:44 06:52 04:27 0.627 5:38 8:18 0.011
Time-to-last idea 06:22 07:43 08:05 0.156 7:28 8:05 0.721
Time-to-last collapse 13:00 14:20 13:46 0.836 13:47 13:51 0.924
Time-to-last stacking 16:28 16:57 18:29 0.009 17:23 16:37 0.415
Note. Columns 2-4 and 6-7 show means of activity variables by treatment. Reported p-values indicate significance
levels from Trend tests within Exog and two-sided Rank Sum tests comparisons for Exog vs Endog.
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C. Multiple Hypothesis Adjustment
Table 7 Multiple hypothesis adjustment for main results
Analysis Variable Coef
Unad-
justed
p−value
Adjusted
p−value
(Holm 1979)
Experiment 1: 5/15 1.416 0.009 0.027
Treatment effect on 10/10 0.794 0.046 0.092
non-failure (Table 2, col. 2) 15/5 0.395 0.265 0.265
Experiment 1: 5/15 3.688 0.034 0.068
Treatment effect on 10/10 4.181 0.011 0.033
performance (Table 2, col. 6) 15/5 3.093 0.056 0.068
Experiment 1+2: Exog 3.584 0.010 0.040
Treatment effect on Nudge 2.937 0.082 0.156
performance (Table 4, col. 1) Pre-commit 2.908 0.078 0.156
Prototype 4.367 0.010 0.040
Experiment 1+2: Exog 3.119 0.022 0.066
Joint effects of treatments Nudge 3.120 0.057 0.104
and process variables Pre-commit 3.112 0.052 0.104
(Table 4, col. 2) Prototype 4.951 0.003 0.012
Time-to-first idea -0.490 0.000 0.000
Experiment 1+2: Exog 2.498 0.069 0.207
Joint effects of treatments Nudge 2.241 0.172 0.258
and process variables Pre-commit 2.429 0.129 0.258
(Table 4, col. 3) Prototype 3.856 0.020 0.080
Time-to-first stacking -0.416 0.000 0.000
Experiment 1+2: Exog 4.264 0.008 0.024
Joint effects of treatments Nudge 2.871 0.152 0.152
and process variables Pre-commit 4.103 0.030 0.060
(Table 4, col. 4) Prototype 6.587 0.001 0.004
Time-to-first collapse -0.400 0.000 0.000
Note. The adjusted p-values are calculated for each “family” of hypotheses. We draw on the definition of the
family of hypotheses in List et al. (2016). We define the “family” of hypotheses as the group of tests of the effects
of multiple treatments (and additional covariates in question) on the same outcome variable, in our case binary
or continuous measures of performance. We use the Holm-Bonferroni adjustment (Holm 1979). This procedure
is a sequential version of the Bonferroni correction. We first obtain the unadjusted p-values. The hypotheses are
then ordered from the one with the smallest p-value to the one with the largest. The hypothesis with the lowest
p-value is tested first using the standard Bonferroni correction. The second p−value is then adjusted using the
Bonferroni correction but the number of hypotheses is reduced by one, and so on for the remaining adjustments.
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D. Instructions [Exact Transctipt, Endog Treatment]
Your objective is to build a structure that will support as many coins as possible as high off the table as
possible. Your structure may use at most 10 cards and 10 clips. You will have a total of 20 minutes to
complete this task. Please raise your hand if you finish working earlier, so that the experimenter can evaluate
your work.
Your Payoff. Your performance will be judged based on the following formula:
Your Payoff =
[height of the highest set of coins in inches]× [monetary value of these coins]
3
The coins that count toward your payoff include the highest stack of coin (measured as the distance between
the highest coin and the table), and all other coins at the same height level as this stack. The height will be
rounded to the nearest inch. For example, if your highest coin is 9 inches off the table and there is a total
of 8 coins stacked at that height, you will receive 9×8×$0.25
3
= $6 for this task. Please keep in mind that
your structure has to be stable, so that the experimenter can measure the height reliably. To be precise, your
structure has to stand for at least 3 minutes. If it collapses within 3 minutes after submission, your payoff
for this task will be 0.
Note that if you place coins at different heights, coins that are not at the same level as the highest set of
coins will not count towards your payoff. For example if your structure is 9 inches high, but you have placed
8 quarters at the top and 5 quarters at the height of 2 inches, your payoff will only include the value of the
8 quarters at the top. Thus, your payoff will still be 9×8×$0.25
3
= $6. In other words, only the set of coins at
the highest distance off the table counts. You are not allowed to distribute the coins over multiple structures.
Timing. Completion of the task consists of two parts: Design and Implementation. For the design part
you will get an unlimited amount of playing cards and clips. The design materials should help you explore
different possibilities. Experimenting may improve the final outcome of your work. Make sure that you make
the most out of the materials you are given.
Once you feel certain about the final structure you want to submit, raise your hand. The experimenter
will then take away your first set of materials and give you the final set of materials. Now the set of materials
will include 10 cards and 10 clips only. These are the materials that you will use for the implementation.
You will have a total of 20 minutes, which means you must plan ahead, so that you have enough time to
build your final structure. For example, if you raise your hand after 10 minutes, you will have 10 minutes left
to implement your design using the final set of materials. It is your responsibility to tell the experimenter
when you want to get the final set of materials, so that you can build your final structure.
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